Home / Senate confirmation

The process takes almost three times as long as it did during the Reagan administration 

As President Donald Trump plans to enter the White House for the second time, a major responsibility will be to fill the more than 1,300 political appointee positions that require Senate confirmation. As with all recent presidents, Trump will face a problem that has been growing over time—the Senate confirmation process has become more cumbersome because the Senate’s responsibility to “advise and consent” takes far longer now than it did in previous years.

The official confirmation process takes almost three times as long now as it did during President Ronald Reagan’s administration. Throughout President Joe Biden’s administration confirmations have taken an average of about 192 days from the time they were officially submitted to the Senate until they were confirmed (as of Nov. 11, 2024). By contrast, during Reagan’s administration, the average confirmation took 69 days. These numbers include all civilian Senate-confirmed positions except for judges, marshals and U.S. attorneys.

Many factors contribute to the length of time that nominations remain pending in the Senate. The Senate must focus on a wide range of issues and processes beyond nominations. Additionally, any senator can place a “hold” on a nominee to attempt to extract concessions on matters unrelated to the nominee’s qualifications. And the Senate has increased the use of filibusters to delay nominations over time.

The lengthy Senate confirmation process has resulted in delays in filling many critical management and policy-focused positions, and some key jobs have remained vacant for years. Such vacancies make it difficult for agencies to undertake long-term planning and harm the public reliant on their services.

The Senate can move quickly on nominations when it so choses. In fact, nominees for Cabinet secretary positions are often confirmed quickly, especially at the start of a new administration. Since 1981, Cabinet secretaries have been confirmed in an average of 25 days, compared with 112 days for all other positions.

In fact, movement on Cabinet secretaries often occurs even before a new president takes office. Of Biden’s first 15 nominations for Cabinet positions, four had Senate hearings prior to Biden’s inauguration and six were confirmed within a month after he took office. For Trump’s first term, 12 nominees for Cabinet positions had hearings prior to Inauguration Day and nine were confirmed within a month of him taking office.  

Presidents have the most success filling Senate-confirmed positions during their first year in office 

Presidents have incentives to fill positions quickly after taking office. Not only are these jobs important for effective governing, but the Senate confirmation process is faster in an administration’s first year than in nearly any other year of a president’s term. For the past seven presidents, the confirmation process for nominations submitted during the first year averaged 87 days, 26 days faster than any other year, except for the last year in office when a president is finishing their second term. This is in part because presidents often have a honeymoon period soon after their inauguration and because many early nominations involve highly ranked positions that receive priority. 

Conclusion 

Presidential appointees requiring Senate confirmation face a process that is longer, harder, more public and more complex than their predecessors faced 40 years ago. While our nation relies on talented individuals to assume leadership roles in government, the difficulty of navigating the Senate confirmation process makes the prospect of a presidential appointment daunting. Many service-minded people even forego a presidential appointment because the lengthy process takes a heavy toll on their professional and personal lives. 

Congress should consider reforms to improve the confirmation process such as decreasing the number of positions requiring Senate approval and improving the Senate’s privileged calendar process. Additionally, incoming presidential administrations should move quickly to vet and submit their nominations—starting right after Election Day.  

The federal government will operate most effectively—and be most accountable to the public—when the best and the brightest are motivated to serve their country. Senators should work across party lines to confirm qualified appointees and consider reforms to make the process run smoothly. And every administration will benefit from starting early and moving with speed to staff the government. 

Every new president faces the management challenge of filling out the leadership ranks of federal agencies with more than 4,000 presidential appointees. The most senior of those positions must go through an increasingly difficult and lengthy Senate confirmation process. While figuring out how many positions require Senate confirmation would seem to be straightforward, getting a precise count is actually quite difficult.  

For years, the Partnership for Public Service’s Center for Presidential Transition® has written that new presidents generally fill more than 1,200 such positions. By contrast, Vanderbilt Professor David Lewis—one of the leading authorities on presidential appointments—has compiled a list of 1,340 Senate-confirmed positions. Why the discrepancy? Shouldn’t there be a single, straightforward number? 

In actuality, getting a single number is quite difficult. The primary reason is that there are many positions that are “on the books” and eligible to be filled with Senate-confirmed officials, but have not been filled for years. In other words, the best available count is that there are 1,340 eligible Senate-confirmed positions, but recent administrations have not filled all of these jobs and have instead appointed people to serve in slightly more than 1,200 positions.  

Furthermore, the existence of 1,340 Senate-confirmed positions on the books – more than commonly understood – underscores the need for greater transparency and reporting. The government’s “Plum Book” listing political appointees and other top officials has traditionally been produced every four years and has been characterized by numerous omissions and other incorrect information. In 2022, Congress passed the PLUM Act, requiring the Office of Personnel Management to create and annually update a website listing such positions— a positive first step. However, more should be done to ensure that Congress and agencies provide more timely transparency when new positions are created or when positions are changed.  

Determining the number  

To arrive at his detailed list of 1,340 Senate-confirmed positions at the beginning of President Joe Biden’s presidency, Lewis cross-referenced multiple sources. These included the U.S. Government Policy and Supporting Positions book (often referred to as the Plum Book), reports from the Congressional Research Service, information from Congress’ official website Congress.gov, and the Partnership for Public Service’s political appointee tracker.  Lewis’ list is the most detailed and accurate compilation available.  

The last few presidential administrations, however, have not filled all 1,340 positions. Although the numbers change by administrations, slightly more than 1,200 of these positions have actually been filled in recent years. Some positions that are “on the books” have not been filled for decades. For example, the Peace Corps Advisory Board has 15 possible Senate-confirmed positions according to CRS reports. But no one has been nominated for any of those positions since 1992. Some positions have been kept vacant for policy reasons. There has not been an ambassador to Syria for the past decade since diplomatic relations between the countries ended.  

The following sections provide additional details into why counting positions is not a precise endeavor. 

The existing sources of information are inaccurate 

The Plum Book has consistently undercounted the number of Senate-confirmed positions. In the 2020 Plum Book, Lewis found that 276 Senate-confirmed positions were missing. The Center for Presidential Transition found at least 10 agencies were omitted completely.   

This number of missing positions is likely even higher based on information provided on the PLUM website in March of 2024, where only 1,093 Senate confirmed positions were listed—far less than the 1,340 positions included in Lewis’ list. The vast majority of the positions missing from the new Plum website are from part-time boards and commissions. OPM relies on agencies’ self-reports to identify Senate confirmed positions. Therefore, when agencies are under-resourced or inactive, OPM may not receive a timely report and omit these agencies from their accounting.  

The second governmental source of information is a series of reports from the Congressional Research Service. CRS put out seven reports on the number of Senate-confirmed positions between 2003 and 2021. While CRS’ accounting of positions tends to be more accurate than the Plum Book, the reports do not include the nearly 200 ambassador positions, one of the largest classes of Senate-confirmed appointees.  

Other challenges related to counting positions 

Beyond inaccurate or incomplete reporting—and the existence of positions that have not been filled for years—there are several other reasons why a precise accounting of Senate-confirmed positions is difficult to achieve.  

Opportunities for Increased Transparency and Reform 

The vast number of Senate-confirmed positions and the growing difficulty of the Senate confirmation process result in presidents and the Senate focusing more time than ever on processing nominations. This also means that many important agency leadership positions remain vacant for lengthy periods, without adequate transparency into which positions are vacant or who performs the role in the absence of a Senate-confirmed leader. 

The difficulty in coming to a full accounting of Senate confirmed positions suggests a need for more consistent and accurate government reporting. While the new PLUM Act database will make reporting more frequent, agencies and OPM have more work to do to ensure that more timely and accurate information is provided. And while the PLUM Act requires only an annual update of the information in the database, as OPM makes continual improvements to the database, it should aim for – and Congress should support – a system that provides as close to real-time transparency as possible.  

The Senate also should consider stronger mechanisms to enforce the requirement that committees justify the creation of any new Senate-confirmed position. Additionally, the Senate could ensure that there is a public report at the end of each session of Congress on the total number of new Senate-confirmed positions created, so the new confirmation responsibilities being placed on both the presidency and the Senate can be fully understood. 

Today marks a momentous and somber date—9/11. We can never forget the unprecedented attack on our country 23 years ago. We thank the many public servants, at all levels, who played critical roles that day and afterward.  

One of the lessons of 9/11 was the need for a new administration to have its national security team in place as quickly as possible after the inauguration. When the contested 2000 election paused George W. Bush’s transition, for example, it delayed the appointment and subsequent confirmation of key national security officials, an important factor in our country being unprepared for the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  

In a recent op-ed for The Washington Post, Max Stier, the president and CEO of the Partnership for Public Service, emphasized the urgent need for Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump to immediately begin comprehensive transition planning that should include identifying members of their national security teams. He warned that failing to do so quickly, especially in light of the slow Senate confirmation process, could endanger our nation’s safety and stability. 

For more on how a prolonged confirmation process can undermine national security, read our December 2020 blog post on the bipartisan 9/11 Commission’s findings below. 

This piece was originally published on December 16, 2020.

By Alex Tippett

A transition to a new presidential administration is a unique moment of vulnerability for our country. As President-elect Joe Biden selects his full national security team and the Senate prepares to consider presidential appointments, the experiences of previous transitions serve as cautionary tale for why slow nominations and lengthy confirmation processes can leave the nation vulnerable.  

The most prominent example of how a prolonged confirmation process can undermine national security is the terrorist attacks of the Sept. 11, 2001, which occurred about eight months into President George W. Bush’s first year in office. At that time, many national security positions were vacant due in part to the shortened transition period after the contested 2000 election and the challenges associated with getting officials into Senate-confirmed positions.

At the time of the attacks, only 57% of the 123 top Senate-confirmed positions were filled at the Pentagon, Department of Justice and Department of State combined excluding ambassadors, U.S. marshals and attorneys. Of those officials who were in place, slightly less than half (45%) had been confirmed within the previous two months.  

The bipartisan 9/11 Commission, which reviewed the causes of the attacks and its consequences, focused on the impact of the slow confirmation process. The commission suggested that delays could undermine the country’s safety, arguing that because “a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the process for national security appointments.”

While Congress implemented a number of the commission’s recommendations, the nomination process continues to be a liability and underlines the importance of moving swiftly to confirm qualified nominees.

Confirming the Bush National Security Team

Most of Bush’s leadership at the Department of Defense took months to get into place. While Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was confirmed on Jan. 20, 2001 and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, was confirmed in late February and no other member of the DOD’s leadership team was confirmed until May. 

It was during this period that the Bush administration faced its first major national security test. On April 1, 2001, a Navy surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea. The Chinese pilot was killed in the collision and the American crew was taken into captivity. Over the next 11 days, a tense standoff ensued. While the crisis was eventually brought to a peaceful close, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld were the only Senate-confirmed members of Bush’s DOD team, with the third and fourth ranking appointees confirmed on May 1, 2001—a full month after the incident began.

By the time of the 9/11 attacks, the Senate had confirmed a total of 33 DOD officials. Two-thirds of those officials had been on the job for less than two months. According to the 2000 Plum Book, there were 45 positions at DOD requiring Senate confirmation, leaving 12 important jobs empty on 9/11.

In an interview with the University of Virginia’s Miller Center, Stephen Hadley, Bush’s deputy national security advisor, suggested the slow pace of nominations undermined the administration’s ability to develop a response to the threat posed by the al-Qaeda terrorist group responsible for 9/11. “When people say, ‘Well, you had nine months to get an alternative strategy on al-Qaeda,’ no, you didn’t. Once people got up and got in their jobs you had about four months.”

Empty seats and a slow nomination process also hurt other parts of the Bush administration. Michael Chertoff, who served as head of the Department of Justice’s criminal division on 9/11, recalled, “We were shorthanded in terms of senior people….we essentially had to do double and triple-duty to pick up some of the responsibilities that would have been taken by others who were confirmed.”

Following a bitter five-week struggle, John Ashcroft was confirmed as attorney general on Feb. 1, 2001. His deputy, Larry Thompson, was confirmed on May 10, along with Assistant Attorney for Legislative Affairs Daniel Bryant.

Excluding U.S. marshals and attorneys, DOJ had 34 Senate-confirmedpositions in 2000. But Just 41% of those jobs were filled on 9/11. Half of those 14 officials—including then FBI Director Robert Mueller–were on the job less than two months before the attacks.

Bush’s State Department, supported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, moved faster than other committees in the early days of the administration, but then slowed its pace. Before June, the State Department filled 20 of 44 Senate-confirmed positions, excluding ambassadorships. On 9/11, just 24, or 55%, of the 44 positions at the State Department were filled.

Conclusion

In light of these delays, the 9/11 commission recommended that, “A president-elect should submit the nominations of the entire new national security team, through the level of undersecretary of Cabinet departments, not later than January 20. The Senate, in return, should adopt special rules requiring hearings and votes to confirm or reject national security nominees within 30 days of their submission.”

Both the Senate and the Biden team should work to meet this standard.  And while the Senate should carefully scrutinize every nominee, it also should recognize that unnecessary delays could undermine the ability of the new administration to respond to the threats we currently face and those that are unexpected.

To learn more about the presidential transition process, explore our 2024 Presidential Transition Guide. It features detailed outlines of best practices, historical materials from past transitions, and recommendations for a successful presidential transition to a new or second-term administration. 

During a recent hearing before the Senate Rules Committee, Jenny Mattingly, the Partnership’s vice president of government affairs, called for reform of the confirmation process to make it work better for all stakeholders – the Senate, the executive branch, individual nominees and the public.

The testimony highlighted how the process required to select, nominate and vote on presidential appointees is now longer, more complicated and more uncertain than ever before.

To make this point, Mattingly highlighted data from the Center for Presidential Transition’s® research on the Senate confirmation process: 

– The number of Senate-confirmed positions increased by more than 70% between 1960 and 2020, from 779 to 1,340. 

– It now takes the Senate nearly four times longer to confirm a nominee than it did during President Ronald Reagan’s administration.  

– The number of Senate-confirmed positions increased by more than 70% between 1960 and 2020, from 779 to 1,340. 

– It now takes the Senate nearly four times longer to confirm a nominee than it did during President Ronald Reagan’s administration.  

– The percentage of Senate votes on nominations now far exceeds votes on legislation. Procedural votes, cloture votes to end debate and direct votes on presidential nominations made up 64 percent of all recorded Senate votes during President Donald Trump’s administration, and 58 percent so far into President Joe Biden’s administration. This compares with just 15 percent during the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency and 14 percent during Barack Obama’s time in office. 

– Layer upon layer of nominees has created extended delays in confirmation of lower level nominees. During the Biden administration, Cabinet secretaries and deputy secretaries have taken about 19 days and 59 days, respectively, to be confirmed. However, those further down the leadership hierarchy (e.g., assistant secretaries and directors) have taken about 200 days on average to be confirmed. 

– Senate confirmed positions are vacant more frequently and for longer periods of time than in the past. Four Cabinet departments, for example, had 30% or more of their key positions vacant as of March of this year.

The broken process is undermining the Senate’s constitutional powers, both because it has led to executive branch efforts to sidestep Senate confirmation altogether by relying on non-confirmed officials, and because the extraordinary amount of time being spent on nominations has decreased the time spent on legislating by the Senate.

In addition, agencies suffer from gaps in leadership that hobble long-term planning and the execution of the responsibilities Congress has assigned to them, which is a disservice to constituents who rely on federal services. Moreover, the increasingly laborious experience that nominees—and their families— experience in going through the confirmation process discourages qualified individuals from wanting to accept a government position.

In order to make the confirmation process work better for all stakeholders, the Partnership’s testimony identified five priorities:  

– Reduce the number of positions subject to Senate confirmation by modeling the bipartisan law enacted in 2011.  

– Develop a model for “bundling” nominations which would allow for at least some nominees to be joined  together for a final vote on the Senate floor.  

– Improve the privileged nomination process designed to speed up consideration of some presidential appointees generally considered noncontroversial and pursue other changes to Senate processes for executive branch nominations that could win broad bipartisan support.  

– Revisit the 2012 and 2013 recommendations of the Working Group on Streamlining Paperwork for Executive Nominations.  

– Increase transparency into the appointments process while strengthening agency accountability to Congress when vacancies occur by improving the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. 

During the hearing, senators on both sides of the aisle engaged in a constructive conversation about how to make the confirmation process work more effectively while maintaining the Senate’s constitutional role to provide advice and consent on nominees. We continue to be optimistic that this is an area ripe for bipartisan reform and that the data will make the call to action clear.

Chris Piper is a manager on the Partnership’s Center for Presidential Transition team. 

Given the increasing delays presidents face in getting senior leaders confirmed by the Senate, it is important to understand how long those officials remain in their roles once confirmed. While our previous analysis highlights year three as a time of high appointee turnover during  a president’s first term, incumbent presidents entering a second term face even greater challenges. 

Incumbent administrations transitioning to a second term have historically confronted significant headwinds. The fifth year can be encumbered by political opposition in Congress, and the departure of knowledgeable officials can make it even more difficult for an administration to achieve its policy goals. Without sufficient personnel and resources dedicated to second term personnel planning, two-term administrations will miss an important opportunity to gain early momentum following reelection. 

Our analysis examines the turnover of Senate confirmed presidential appointees during the second term of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama in major departments and agencies, excluding ambassadors, U.S. marshals and attorneys. 

Turnover across terms

In year five, Bush and Obama experienced average annual turnover rates of 38% and 28% respectively, the highest in their entire presidencies. For context, Bush had 135 departures out of 353 tracked positions and Obama had 101 departures out 359 positions. For Obama, this was more than doubled the peak annual turnover in his first term (13%); for Bush, the second-term peak was nearly double the first term’s (20%). 

Years six through eight for both presidents exceeded or were comparable to their third-year turnover levels, highlighting the sustained volatility in personnel departures throughout the second term. 

Personnel turnover in the fifth year is an early management obstacle for administrations starting a second term. These findings demonstrate the urgency of second term planning if incumbent administrations are to expeditiously fill senior leadership positions as they become vacant. 

Note: Data includes Senate-confirmed positions excluding ambassadors, U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals. Yearly average turnover is weighted by the number of positions tracked for each president. 

Second-term turnover by department 

In every department, the Bush and Obama administrations experienced significantly higher turnover during the second term compared to the first. The highest turnover rate was at the Department of Education under Bush at 128%, meaning that there were 23 departures for 18 tracked positions during his time in office. Several other departments under Bush also experienced turnover rates that exceeded 100%, including the departments of Housing and Urban Development (109%), Justice (104%), Transportation (113%) and State (115%). These departments experienced several departures from the same position within one term. Departures at assistant secretary level at Bush’s Department of Education were frequent, as officials rarely remained for more than two years. 

While the Obama administration had relatively lower levels of turnover, all departments exceeded 50% turnover except for the Department of Labor (47%). For Obama, the Department of Transportation had a peak turnover rate of 100%, nearly 10 times the turnover compared to his first term (13%). 

Note: Data covers Senate-confirmed positions in executive CFO Act agencies, excluding ambassadors, U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals. The time period covered in the first term is from the beginning of the administration through April 1 of the fourth year. 

An incumbent administration must balance the difficult tasks of managing ongoing government operations while preparing prior to the election for a transition to a possible second term. The rigor and planning needed to successfully staff some of the highest-ranking positions in the executive branch is critical for a successful second term administration.

This blog post was authored by Husam AlZubaidy, an associate at the Partnership’s Center for Presidential Transition. 

This week marks the beginning of Pride month, a time in which we reflect on the history and achievements of the LGBTQ+ community and reaffirm our unwavering support for equality and inclusivity. The Partnership for Public Service and Center for Presidential Transition honor the service of countless LGBTQ+ public servants who have served across administrations.

The service of LGBTQ+ individuals in the federal government has not always been celebrated. Beginning in the late 1940s, in the midst of the Cold War, there was a “Lavendar Scare” that focused on purging the federal civil service, along with government contractors, of gays and lesbians. President Dwight Eisenhower formalized the policy in April of 1953 with Executive Order 10450 which authorized the investigation and firing of civil servants for “sexual perversion.” Due to this policy, tens of thousands of civil servants were investigated and thousands lost their careers.

The policy of targeting gay and lesbian civil servants continued for decades. It was not until 1975 that the Civil Service Commission ended the ban on gays and lesbians in the federal civil service and 1977 that the Department of State ended its ban within the Foreign Service. It took another two decades until discrimination based on sexual orientation was banned in granting access to classified information, when President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12968 in 1995.

Even as formal constraints on the service of LGBTQ+ individuals were removed over time, LGBTQ+ individuals continued to face opposition because of their identities. Roberta Achtenberg, the first openly LGBTQ+ Senate-confirmed appointee who won approval in 1993, and James Hormel, the first openly LGBTQ+ ambassador who took office through a recess appointment in 1999, faced questions about their ability to serve based on their identities alone.

Despite obstacles, openly LGBTQ+ individuals have served in appointed leadership roles in each of the last five administrations. Clinton led the way by making the first nominations of openly LGBT individuals, appointing about 140 to serve in his administration. President Barack Obama nearly doubled that number, appointing over 250 openly LGBTQ+ officials during his administration.

Milestones of LGBTQ+ Service and Leadership in the Federal Government

Biden has appointed more openly LGBTQ+ officials than any of his predecessors. As of October of 2023, Biden had appointed over 340 openly LGBTQ+ officials across the executive branch. Annise Parker, president of the LGBTQ Victory Institute, which works to advance LGBTQ+ elected and appointed government officials, described the Biden administration as “the most LGBTQ-inclusive in history…”

Our government is best when it is representative of its people and inclusive to all. Despite discrimination and bigotry, LGBTQ+ individuals have always strived to serve their government and country. Thanks to social and legal progress over time, the government benefits more than ever from the leadership of LGBTQ+ officials.

Given the long hours and tough responsibilities at Cabinet agencies, presidents can expect departures among Senate-confirmed leadership. While turnover is expected, high departure rates can pose significant challenges for day-to-day agency operations and long-term planning. 

Turnover in the modern context is more troublesome than ever before. Our research shows that Senate confirmation times have grown for each subsequent administration while nomination success rates have progressively declined. This means that, when agency leaders depart, it will take significantly longer to replace them than it did for previous presidents. As a result, many positions remain vacant for extended periods of time. 

Using our political appointee tracker and other data sources, we have examined the rates of Senate-confirmed appointee turnover during the four most recent administrations. As we look to personnel changes following the November election—whether it be a second term for the incumbent or a new administration—a retrospective on turnover helps put recent personnel challenges in context.  

We analyzed turnover among presidential nominees in major departments and agencies,1 excluding U.S. marshals and attorneys. To make an equivalent comparison with the ongoing Biden administration, we looked at each president’s first term up until April 1 of their fourth year in office.

AdministrationBushObamaTrumpBiden
Total Departures10573 94 34 
Tracked Positions353 359 385 392 
Total Turnover Rate30% 20% 24% 9% 
Note: Data covers Senate-confirmed positions in executive CFO Act agencies, excluding ambassadors, U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals. The time period covered is from the beginning of the administration through April 1 of the fourth year.  

The Bush administration experienced the highest total turnover at 30% during this period of time. Trump and Obama had lower and more comparable turnover rates at 24% and 20%, respectively. Biden experienced significantly less turnover than his predecessors at 9%. 

Note: Data includes Senate-confirmed positions excluding ambassadors, U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals. The time period from the beginning of the administration through April 1 of the fourth year.

Looking closer at these departments by president, the total turnover rates during the Bush and Obama administrations (59% and 30% respectively) were greatly impacted by Treasury Department departures. As for the Department for Veterans Affairs, Bush and Trump received the highest rates of turnover (50% and 33% respectively). The Department of Commerce—despite undergoing some of the highest rates of turnover on average—did not experience any turnover during the Biden administration through this past April. Moreover, there were no departures of Biden appointees during this period at the Environmental Protection Agency, or at the departments of Education and Energy. Similarly, the Trump administration had no turnover of its appointees at the Department of Agriculture despite turnover rates at other departments. 

The departments of Transportation and Homeland Security also highlight differences. Trump experienced roughly five times more turnover than previous administrations at DHS (53%), the second highest rate of any other department. As for Biden, the DOT experienced the second highest rate of total turnover so far during his presidency (17%), exceeding two previous administrations but trailing the Bush administration (38%). For context, DHS had an average turnover rate of 21% while DOT’s rate was 20% during the past four administrations. While Trump had more than double the average turnover at DHS, Biden remains below the DOT average. 

Note: Data covers Senate-confirmed positions in executive CFO Act agencies, excluding ambassadors, U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals. The time period covered is from the beginning of the administration through April 1 of the fourth year. 

For each administration, turnover peaked during year three with relatively low turnover in other years. Compared to recent presidents, Biden has maintained low turnover, rising only to 6% during his third year. Obama was the next lowest in year three turnover, but the rate was nearly double at 13%. The second year of administrations has had low turnover in general, with the highest turnover occurring during the Trump administration (6%). For all four presidents, the first year had turnover rates at or below 1%. 

Recent success during the Biden administration at limiting turnover rates is an important development in light of increasing confirmation delays. Even as turnover appears to have tempered during the current administration, there are greater ramifications for each departure as it becomes more difficult to confirm a replacement. 

The challenger candidate in the 2024 election must consider how to staff an entire administration, but even the incumbent candidate must take proactive steps to avoid trends from previous second term presidents to retain leaders in key positions in order to achieve policy goals. 

1 As defined by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–576).

This blog post was authored by Husam AlZubaidy, an associate at the Partnership’s Center for Presidential Transition.

The Senate confirmation process for executive branch nominees has become more difficult during the last 40 years.

President Joe Biden’s nominees have taken nearly three times longer to be confirmed during his first three years compared to the nominees in the George H.W. Bush administration.

Confirmation delays continued to grow under the Trump administration and have worsened further under Biden. Delays faced by Biden’s nominees in the first three years were 13% longer than Trump’s nominees.

Beyond confirmation times, presidents during the last 40 years have seen fewer and fewer of their nominees confirmed by the Senate. Through year three, Presidents Donald Trump and Biden each had approximately 150 fewer nominees confirmed compared to President Barack Obama and 250 to 300 fewer nominees confirmed compared to Presidents H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

The broken process leaves critical positions vacant for long periods of time, which is a disservice to the public in carrying out the fundamental roles of government, from national security to infrastructure to health and safety.

Using an analysis of our Political Appointee Tracker, we have been able to gain a clearer view of vacancy rates under the Biden and Trump administrations.

From our analysis of the state of vacancies in Cabinet Departments as of March 19th in the fourth year of the last two administrations, we found that:

Vacancies are widespread across Cabinet departments

As of March 19, 2024, 98 of 547 Cabinet department positions (18%) followed on our tracker were vacant in the Biden administration. At the same point in time, 157 of 526 Cabinet department positions (30%) followed on our tracker were vacant during the Trump administration. 

Some Cabinet departments have alarmingly high rates of vacancies

Four Cabinet departments had 30% or more of their positions vacant as of March 19, 2024. At the equivalent date during Trump’s fourth year, nine Cabinet departments had 30% or more of their positions vacant. For both administrations, the Department of Homeland Security had the highest vacancy rate at 35% in the Biden administration and 65% in the Trump administration. The departments of Housing and Urban Development and Justice also have consistently had high rates of vacancies, totaling more than 30% across the last two administrations.

Note: Excludes U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals

Many Cabinet positions have yet to be filled more than three years into last two administrations

As of March 19, 2024, 50 Cabinet positions (9%) had never been filled with a Senate confirmed appointee since the beginning of the Biden administration. At the same point in time, 66 Cabinet positions (13%) had never been filled with a Senate confirmed appointee since the beginning of the Trump administration. The Department of Justice has been particularly affected by this problem, with over 25% of Senate confirmed positions never having someone confirmed by the Senate through March 19 of the fourth year of the last two administrations.

Note: Excludes U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals

Nineteen Cabinet positions were not filled by either the Trump or Biden administration by March 19 of their fourth year

Across the Trump and Biden administrations, there are 19 positions in common that remained vacant during the first three years of each administration. Four of these positions are the chief financial officers at the departments of Agriculture, Homeland Security, State and Treasury. The list also includes high-level positions like the director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Positions Not Filled by the Fourth Year of Each of the Last Two Administrations

PositionAgency
Chief financial officerDepartment of Agriculture
Assistant secretary for civil rightsDepartment of Agriculture
Assistant secretary for communications and outreachDepartment of Education
Assistant secretary for planning and evaluationDepartment of Health and Human Services
Chief financial officerDepartment of Homeland Security
Director, Immigration and Customs EnforcementDepartment of Homeland Security
Assistant attorney general for the tax divisionDepartment of Justice
Deputy administrator, Drug Enforcement AdministrationDepartment of Justice
Commissioner, U.S. Parole Commission (2)Department of Justice
Special counsel for immigration-related unfair employment practicesDepartment of Justice
Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement CommissionDepartment of Justice
Chief financial officerDepartment of State
Coordinator for threat reduction programsDepartment of State
Ambassador, BahamasDepartment of State
Ambassador, CubaDepartment of State
Director, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and EnforcementDepartment of the Interior
Special trustee for American IndiansDepartment of the Interior
Chief financial officerDepartment of the Treasury

These findings highlight the challenges in filling certain key roles in government. Reform of the confirmation process is urgently needed, starting with a reduction in the number of appointments subject to Senate approval.

Chris Piper is a manager at the Center for Presidential Transition.

Benjamin Franklin once said, “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.”

Following the last four presidential elections, the Partnership for Public Service and our Center for Presidential Transition have collected lessons learned on transition activities, which have helped inform four rounds of bipartisan laws passed to bring the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 in line with modern transition practices.

The transition law requires the General Services Administration to provide office space and other core support to presidents-elect and vice-presidents elect, as well as pre-election preparation space and support to major candidates. It also provides a framework for GSA, the White House and federal agencies to coordinate transition planning.

The updates to the law have had a profound impact in shifting the narrative around transition planning. Presidential candidates used to shy away from transition planning, worried that the public would see them as prematurely “measuring the drapes” of the Oval Office. Congress has helped change that perception and, through its oversight and legislation, has emphasized the importance of early planning by the transition teams of candidates as well as by agencies across the government. This tradition now continues with a new bill, the Agency Preparation for Transitions Act, sponsored by Sens. Gary Peters (D-Mich.) and Susan Collins (R-Maine).

Highlights include:

While candidates in recent elections have begun transition planning well before the election, the roughly 75 days between Election Day and Inauguration Day is a crucial period for an incoming president, during which agencies begin to brief the transition team on major policy issues and decisions that will confront the incoming administration on Day One. The bipartisan work of Congress over the years in fine-tuning the Presidential Transition Act has made the run-up to

Inauguration Day much less complicated and has enabled presidents-elect to take maximum advantage of the short post-election transition period.

Even if a sitting president wins re-election, the transition planning is not all for naught. The Center’s research has shown a high turnover rate of appointees as presidents move from a first to a second term. As first-term presidents plan for a second term, the briefing materials prepared by agencies are valuable alike to incoming appointees of a new president and for a second-term president. Under either scenario, the Presidential Transition Act allows the winner of the election an opportunity to heed Ben Franklin’s advice and prepare for success.

This piece was originally published on the Partnership for Public Service’s blog, We the Partnership, on September 9, 2021.

By Carter Hirschhorn and Dan Hyman

Saturday marks the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, a tragedy that changed our country and the world. In 2004, a bipartisan commission investigating the attacks issued the “9/11 Commission Report,” which made 41 recommendations to prevent future terrorist attacks and strengthen our national security. One of the report’s most notable findings was that a delayed presidential transition in 2000 “hampered the new administration in identifying, recruiting, clearing, and obtaining Senate confirmation of key appointees.”

Importantly, this finding revealed our country’s flawed political appointment process and showed how slow Senate confirmations can imperil our national security. The commission’s report recommended several improvements to this process to ensure both our country’s safety – particularly during and in the immediate aftermath of a presidential transition – and continuity within government.

Appointment delays in 2001

The commission found that George W. Bush lacked key deputy Cabinet and subcabinet officials until the spring and summer of 2001, noting that “the new administration—like others before it—did not have its team on the job until at least six months after it took office,” or less than two months before 9/11. On the day of the attacks, only 57% of the top 123 Senate-confirmed positions were filled at the Pentagon, the Justice Department and the State Department combined, excluding ambassadors, U.S. marshals and attorneys. 

New legislation since 2001

In the aftermath of 9/11, new laws addressed several recommendations highlighted in the “9/11 Commission Report.” The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 expedited security clearances for key national security positions, recommended that administrations submit nominations for national security positions by Inauguration Day and encouraged the full Senate to vote on these positions within 30 days of nomination.

The Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 provided additional pre-election services to presidential candidates and the incumbent administration, enabling them to better prepare for a transfer of power or a second term, and to more quickly nominate key officials. The Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011 also reduced the overall number of Senate-confirmed positions by 163 in an attempt to free up more time for the Senate to confirm higher-level, policy-making roles.

Key areas for improvement in 2021

Despite these advances, the Senate confirmation process takes longer than ever; and vacancies in key Senate-confirmed positions continue to increase.  For example, the Partnership’s latest report, Unconfirmed: Why reducing the number of Senate-confirmed positions can make government more effective, revealed that the number of positions requiring Senate confirmation has grown more than 50% from 1960. Partly for this reason, several positions critical to our safety and national security remain unfilled more than seven months after President Biden’s inauguration. These positions include the assistant secretary for homeland defense and global security at the Defense Department, the assistant secretary for intelligence and research at the State Department, and the assistant attorney general for the national security division at the Justice Department.[1]

The fateful morning of Sept. 11 and the subsequent 9/11 Commission Report revealed our need for a more efficient Senate confirmation process. Accelerating this process and reducing the number of Senate-confirmed positions would strengthen our government’s ability to protect the nation and serve the public. To build a better government and a stronger democracy, we must efficiently fill vital leadership roles throughout the federal workforce. That can only happen if we continue to improve the way presidential appointments are made.

[1] As of Wednesday, September 8 the Senate had confirmed Biden nominees for 27% of the top 139 positions at the Pentagon, Justice and State departments combined – excluding ambassadors, U.S. marshals and attorneys.